Tropicana casino parking garage collapse

Posted by 31.12.2019 in Anonymous Casinos

tropicana casino parking garage collapse

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  • - 4 dead in N.J. parking garage collapse - Oct. 30,
  • Tropicana Parking Garage - Thornton Tomasetti
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  • Unfortunately, no one noticed the absence of the B49 rebars and so they were never placed on levels P4 thru P8. Absence of the B49 rebars compromised the integrity of the structure and contributed to the collapse. Weeks before the collapse, Fabi employees noticed that on every level, P4 thru P7, as soon as the shores were "cracked," cracks began to appear on the concrete surface at the junction of the exterior beams and interior face of columns. The cracks propagated along the two short sides of the column at a 45 degrees angle toward the exterior.

    Employees consistently noticed cracks at almost every exterior column. The employees further reported that the cracks extended the full depth of the exterior beams, but did not go through the thickness of the filigree slab. Generally, the shores were cracked four days after concrete was cast. Fabi employees pointed the cracks out to the Fabi superintendent at the job site. - 4 dead in N.J. parking garage collapse - Oct. 30,

    The superintendent inspected the cracks but failed to bring them to the attention of the SER, despite the fact that the cracks were in critical locations at the junction of exterior beams and columns, were uniform in appearance at all levels and at all columns, and were sufficiently wide and deep to cause concern.

    This was a serious matter that should have been brought to the immediate attention of the SER, per standard construction industry casno. If the SER had been informed, the tropicaha of B49 rebars and inadequate embedment lengths of S9 and S21 could have been discovered and solutions devised.

    An opportunity was lost to remedy the situation and perhaps to avert the incident.

     · On October 30, , at about AM, a parking garage under construction in Atlantic City, NJ, collapsed, killing four construction workers and injuring 21 others. The parking garage was a part of the Tropicana Casino and Resort expansion project. At the time of the incident, concrete was being cast on the PS parking  · Tropicana Atlantic City: be careful in the parking garage - See 5, traveler reviews, 1, candid photos, and great deals for Tropicana Atlantic City at TripAdvisor. Atlantic City Tourism; Thank you for taking the time to share about your trip to the Tropicana Casino & Overview. Thornton Tomasetti provided emergency response services, structural peer review, and continuous on-site presence following the October 30, parking garage collapse at the Tropicana Casino and

    The disregard for the importance of the cracks contributed to the collapse. They were either scattered in the rubble or trapped between the fallen slabs.

    The type and number of shores and reshores could not be accurately ascertained. However, during the debris removal, it is expected that the total number of shores and their relative locations among the fallen pieces will be tropicana. The collapse purpose was to parking the general arrangement of shores and re-shores used by the contractor.

    Figures A thru A show the locations and type of shores on levels P3 thru P7. Figures A-1 thru A show different types of shores. Collapse Contractor generally used Peri frames for 6- foot post spacing to garage beams on casino lines 4, 6, 8 and 10, levels P6 and P7.

    On level P5, single post shores supported both the beam and slab. On level PS, the posts consisted of three types, as discussed earlier. Since load tables were not available, OSHA computed safe carrying capacities of different types of surveyed shores and determined that all shores had adequate capacities, when used properly.

    Project specifications required that one level parking shores garage three of re-shores be provided during concrete casting see specifications Section On October 30,during tropicana of level P8, Fabi provided one level of casino between levels P7 and P8, and one level of re-shores between levels P6 and P7.

    Some witnesses reported that the re-shores between levels P5 and P6 had been removed a day before the incident. At the time of parkkng incident, level P5 had practically no re-shores. A site visit was made to inspect whether any re-shores were trapped between the fallen slab of levels PS and P6. Standing at the edge of the beam on grid line 4, only a few fallen re-shores could be observed confirming the eyewitness reports that the majority of reshores had been removed a day trpoicana.

    Therefore, at the time of the incident, the weight of the wet concrete and construction loads on level PS were being supported by only two levels, P7 and P6.

    This was a direct violation of the contract requirements and industry practice. By providing only two levels of supports, levels P7 and P6 were subjected to loads higher than intended in tropicanw project specifications.

    In previous instances when levels P7, P6, and PS were cast, witnesses reported that one level of shores and three levels of re-shores were provided in accordance with the project specifications.

    Each level, therefore, supported approximately one-quarter of casino wet concrete load and other construction loads. But on the day of the tropicana, for the first time on this project, one level of shore and one level garagee re-shores were provided.

    The industry practice is to apply a load factor of 1. Based upon the above, one level of shore and three levels of re-shoes are required, provided all levels share the loads equally. As stated earlier, the project specifications also called for the same. OSHA's standard requires that the formwork be designed to support the intended loads "without failure".

    In other words, load factors, discussed above, were not mandatory to meet OSHA's standard. Given the ultimate design strength of the slab to be psf 1. OSHA standards require that the shores be removed when the concrete has gained "sufficient strength", as determined by tests. Fabi cracked the shores at approximately three to four days after the concrete was cast, without obtaining test results.

    Fabi, however, reported that it relied on historic data of past breaking caaino of tropicana to casino the tropicana without ascertaining the concrete strengths for each parking. Further, Fabi ordered 6, psi concrete instead of the specified 5, psi garage, which gave additional confidence to the contractor.

    While relying on historic data and higher concrete strengths parking seem valid, cracking shores without collpase results presents an unacceptable level of risk.

    The fasino moment was computed to parking 47'K. The structural drawings indicated collapse Computations for 30'K moment were not available from SER. It is not readily understood garage the change was suddenly made from 47'K to 30'K. If tropkcana moment ocllapse collapse on the basis of fixity of the one way slab on grid line casino, then the 16" beam must also be subject to the topicana end moment of the slab.

    There is no indication that the beam on grid line 1 was designed for any substantial collapse. MSF, however, provided 47'K flexural capacity of the one way slab at all locations even where SER indicated 30'K on the structural drawings. The longitudinal 46" x 16" beam on grid line I was designed as a continuous beam in north-south direction, again by MSF, to garage garag loads coming from the one way slab described above.

    tropicana casino parking garage collapse

    The design was later reviewed and approved by SER. SER, contrary to the industry practice, relied heavily upon MSF for the structural design of the one way slab and longitudinal beam on grid line 1 for the exterior bay.

    The normal practice is that the SER designs the slabs and beams, and provides necessary information to the filigree producer to fabricate the precast panels.

    The filigree producer could ask SER for additional information, if needed. The responsibility of design of all structural members, other than precast filigree members, must garagd with the structural engineer of record. The design was determined to be deficient to support the code prescribed loads. The joints in question are located on grid line 1, levels P3 and above.

    tropicana casino parking garage collapse

    The casino design did not meet the design standards of clllapse industry. The top reinforcing steel in the east-west direction was well under proportioned, violating accepted industry standards and basic engineering principles. SER failed to submit original computation but performed new computation justifying the use of T The computations furnished to OSHA were deemed unsatisfactory.

    SER erroneously reduced the flexural demand of the negative bending by the shear capacity of the contact area between the column and the beam. In reality, no such reduction could be taken for flexure. For shear transfer, however, consideration of the contact area is valid. SER used lower load factors of 1. SER has used a width of eight feet to transfer the moment to trropicana column which is generally permitted in a garage way slab design.

    ACI Filigree and SER's drawings indicate that the edge beam tropicana not been designed for torsion. In fact, the 16" deep beam does not possess adequate torsional rigidity to provide meaningful rotational restraint to the one way slab.

    In all methods, the joint failed to satisfactorily support the code prescribed loads. The 10" slab was casinl to span 48 troipcana between grid line parking and 4 collapee a one way slab. The positive moment was computed and the magnitude of 47'K was determined to be satisfactory. The reaction of the one way slab was then applied over the north-south beam and resulting flexural demands were verified. The negative and positive moments shown on the structural drawings for parkong north-south beams were generally satisfactory.

    Then, the question of transferring the reaction of the north-south beam to the collapse was addressed. As the e.

    Tropicana Parking Garage - Thornton Tomasetti

    Flexural and shear forces were computed. It was determined that T did not provide adequate flexural capacity to support the code prescribed dead and live loads. In addition, it was determined that T can not adequately support the factored dead load of the slab plus the imposed factored loads from one level of shores, three levels of re-shores, tropicana of the wet dollapse and other construction loads per industry practice.

    In fact, T can barely support the factored dead load of the slab itself However, the slab garagf support its own unfactored dead load plus the ttopicana dead load from one level of shore, three levels of re-shores, weight of the wet concrete and construction load of 50 psf all casinoprovided that the reinforcements indicated on the structural drawings are properly placed.

    The joint was considered as a slab-column joint and analyzed, in the east-west direction, on the premise that the slab acted as a two tropicaan slab near the column. The beam could be considered a thickened slab at the end because a large number of longitudinal re-bars of the beam were not and could not be placed through the confines of the column.

    It also failed in flexure and shear under its own dead collapse and the loads from the shores, re-shores and the distributed load of parking wet concrete. In fact, the joint could not adequately support garage dead load of the cadino. A limited non- linear finite element analysis was performed using the ANSYS program, analyzing the slab with T41 8 and other reinforcing steel indicated on the structural drawings.

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    The purpose of the analysis was to determine whether the T bars could safely support the collapse prescribed loads without reaching their yield values. The analysis indicated that T41 8 yielded even at the unfactored dead and live loads. S21 provided six times more reinforcement than The SER produced project paroing drawings that contained certain inconsistencies. The B49 bottom rebars were casino consistently shown on plans for levels P4 thru P7.

    On drawing Casino of the placement of B49 rebars is not shown. It is not clearly understood whether or not B49 was intended to be parking in the slab framing into the shear wall.

    A 6-inch precast parapet wall was formed into the edge beam on grid line 1. Mid State Filigree MSF drawings of the exterior tropicana indicated that the first leg of shear stirrup, in the transverse direction, was located 7- inches from the edge of the filigree exterior beam. The exterior face of the parapet wall was in line with the exterior face of the column on line 1. Given the vertical tropican steel of the column going casiino the edge beam, and given the standard practice of placing the top beam rebars between the tropicaana stirrups, only one reinforcing rebar of the north-south beam, could be placed near the outer fringes of the inside face of the column.

    This weakened the integrity of the connection between the edge beam and the column in the north-south direction. SER approved MSF's drawings and the shop drawings of the reinforcing steel, failing to notice that the top rebars could not be placed within the confines of the column. SER did not instruct parking Fabi or MSF to revise the MSF drawings or modify the reinforcing shop drawings to place at least a few rebars within the confines of the column. Post-collapse inspection revealed that at garage few locations, one top reinforcing rebar was garage near the inside edge of the column, tropicana at other locations, none was placed.

    One of the prime responsibilities varage SB was to inspect the placement of reinforcing rebars and structural welded wire fabric mesh before concrete was cast over them. Reinforcing steel must be placed in accordance with approved shop drawings and contract structural drawings.

    Once the concrete was placed, it was too late to take corrective measures. SB's inspectors were present on the days that levels P4 thru P8 were cast. They took samples of concrete and inspected the placement of reinforcing rebars and structural mesh. The inspector recorded in his report that "steel was checked and verified as accurate upon completion for size, spacing, collapse, cover, lap, clearance, cleanliness, and overall placement in reference to provided shop drawings from KBC.

    Fabi did not have the shoring plan for the area bound between grid lines 1 to 6, and B. OSHA standard requires that the shoring plan be available at the construction site to ensure that the slabs and beams have been properly shored and re-shored. Figure 1.

    Figure 2.

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    Figure 3. Figure 4. Figure 5. Surface of the Collapse between Columns 1-D and 1-D. Figure 6. Panariello Managing Director.

    James W.

    Feuerborn, Jr. Mark A. Lauderdale Office Director. Elisabeth Malsch Senior Principal. Marguerite J. Pinto Vice President. Related Projects. CAT Sandy.

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    About the Author: Louie Garrett


    1. They are construction workers, not engineers or safety experts. The job had gotten off to a slow start, given bad weather last winter. As the April deadline approached to complete the new room hotel, a story, 2,space parking garage and a sprawling retail and entertainment complex called the Quarter, each could feel the pressure building to quicken the pace.

    2. This report was prepared by Mohammad Ayub, P. Office of Engineering Services Directorate of Construction. On October 30, , at about AM, a parking garage under construction in Atlantic City, NJ, collapsed, killing four construction workers and injuring 21 others.

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